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I.

INTRODUCTION

On June 27, 2016, the Supreme Court ruled on its first major
abortion case in nearly a decade: Whole Woman’s Health v.
Hellerstedt.1 In Whole Woman’s Health, the Court reiterated and
expanded upon the “undue burden” standard first established by
Planned Parenthood v. Casey. 2 In doing so, the Court provided
further guidance on how to interpret state laws that regulate abortion
access. While the Court’s decision in Whole Woman’s Health has
major implications for many state regulations concerning abortion
providers, the Court’s holding left unanswered a number of critical
questions. In particular, lower courts and scholars must still grapple
with how to analyze the wide range of abortion-specific informed
consent laws that women must face prior to obtaining abortion
care, 3 including state laws that require women to undergo pre* J.D., Northeastern University School of Law, expected May 2017; M.P.H.,
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, 2015; B.A., University
of Chicago, 2009. Many thanks to my advisor, Professor Wendy Parmet, for
her guidance and support throughout the process of writing this article.
1
Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
2
Id. at 2309 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
878 (1992)).
3
See generally GUTTMACHER INST., State Laws and Policies: An Overview
of Abortion Laws (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.guttmacher.org/statepolicy/explore/overview-abortion-laws (describing the myriad of state laws
that may restrict a woman’s access to abortion services).
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abortion ultrasounds that further require physicians to provide
descriptions of the fetus.4
Most of the challenges to these ultrasound description
mandates, in both legal literature and in the courts, have focused on
the First Amendment rights of physicians and other health
professionals who must provide ultrasound descriptions to a woman
seeking an abortion.5 Courts and scholars have consistently asked
whether health professionals have a First Amendment right against
compelled speech, and if so, whether informed consent ultrasound
laws violate this right.6 Surprisingly little attention has been paid,
however, to the question of whether patients who are required to
hear a pre-abortion ultrasound description may have a right against
“compelled listening.”7
This Note analyzes that question and proposes a different
approach. Rather than attempting to strike down these laws by
navigating the abstruse arena of compelled professional speech or
by grasping to demonstrate an “undue burden” where one may not
exist, public health lawyers and advocates should instead focus on
the rights of the listener, and in particular, move towards
recognition of a woman’s right not to hear. Part II of this Note
provides background on the legal landscape of abortion-specific
informed consent and the legal approaches that have been taken to
challenge restrictive state laws. Part III then explores how the everevolving First Amendment rhetoric and doctrine around
4

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.10(D) (2016); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(4)(C) (West 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
253.10(3g)(2) (West 2016).
5
See, e.g., Scott W. Gaylord & Thomas J. Maloney, Casey and a Woman’s
Right to Know: Ultrasounds, Informed Consent, and the First Amendment, 45
CONN. L. REV. 595 (2012); Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A
First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, U. ILL. L. REV.
939 (2007); Sonia M. Suter, The First Amendment and Physician Speech in
Reproductive Decision Making, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 22 (2015); Ian
Vanderwalker, Abortion and Informed Consent: How Biased Counseling
Laws Mandate Violations of Medical Ethics, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1
(2012).
6
See, e.g., Gaylord & Maloney, supra note 5; Post, supra note 5.
7
See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against
Compelled Listening, 89 BOS. U. L. REV 939, 966 (2009); see also Suter,
supra note 5, at 38.
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professional speech may support the notion of a patient’s right not
to hear. This section also describes how the captive-audience
doctrine can be used to bolster this right for women who are
required to withstand compelled speech within the intimacy of an
abortion clinic, and how the content of emotionally intrusive
information affects this right. Part IV discusses how the current
discourse surrounding ultrasound descriptions in the health
professional’s right against compelled speech may ultimately be
dangerous for public health and for the states’ continuing need to
regulate the practice of medicine. Additionally, Part IV argues that
re-framing the debate to focus on the patient’s right not to hear and
away from the physician’s right not to speak is therefore critical, not
only to challenging the restrictive laws that hinder women’s access
to abortion care, but also to protecting the vital legal mechanisms of
informed consent and of public health law more broadly.
II.

THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE FOR ULTRASOUND DESCRIPTION
MANDATES

At present,8 women in thirty-eight states live in jurisdictions
with abortion-specific informed consent requirements. 9 This
8

This Note was published in May 2017. All research is current up to this date
unless otherwise indicated.
9
GUTTMACHER INST., State Policies in Brief: Counseling and Waiting
Periods
for
Abortion
(Mar.
1,
2016),
https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/spibs/spib_MWPA.pdf
[hereinafter State Counseling Policies]. There have also been attempts to
enact similar legislation at the federal level. Most recently, on January 22,
2015, the Ultrasound Informed Consent Act was introduced to Congress. The
bill has since sat in the Subcommittee on Health. Similar to many of the state
laws, the bill provides that a woman may look away from the required
ultrasound, but the bill is notably silent on whether a woman may refuse to
listen to the explanation of the ultrasound’s depictions. H.R. 492, 114th Cong.
(2015). Additionally, some of these state requirements may, in effect, require
the particularly intrusive procedure of a transvaginal ultrasound, particular for
the vast majority of women who seek abortions in the early stages of
pregnancy. See Jessica Silbey, Picturing Moral Arguments in a Fraught Legal
Arena: Fetuses, Photographic Phantoms and Ultrasounds, 16 GEO. J.
GENDER & L. 1, 6 n.10 (2015) (“The transvaginal ultrasound is a common
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includes twelve states that require a woman to receive counseling
about the “ability of a fetus to feel pain,” six states “that require that
the woman be told that personhood begins at conception,” and five
states that require a woman to receive information “inaccurately
assert[ing] a link between abortion and an increased risk of breast
cancer.”10
Among these abortion-specific informed consent
requirements, as of March 2016, women who seek abortions in
thirteen states are first required to have an ultrasound.11 In ten out
of thirteen of these states, the woman must be “offered” the
“opportunity to view the [ultrasound] image,” and may be offered
the opportunity to hear the fetal heartbeat or to hear a detailed
description of the fetus, its gestational age, and more. In these ten
states, while the ultrasound is mandatory for most women, the
woman is not required to hear a doctor’s description of the fetus or
to view the ultrasound image. 12 However, women who currently
seek abortions in three states – Louisiana, Texas, and Wisconsin –
are required by law to not only have an ultrasound prior to giving
informed consent, but also required to hear a verbal description of
the fetus during the ultrasound procedure.13
These ultrasound mandates – often called Women’s Right to
Know Acts14 or “speech and display” laws15 – are passed under the
procedure for early-stage pregnancies, but like all pregnancy-related
treatment, it is voluntary for women. When requesting an abortion, the
mandatory nature of an ultrasound, coupled with the fact that early-stage
pregnancy ultrasounds are most often conducted transvaginally, makes the
requirement of the ultrasound all that more invasive.”).
10
State Counseling Policies, supra note 9.
11
GUTTMACHER INST., State Policies in Brief: Requirements for Ultrasound
(Mar. 1, 2016), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RFU.pdf.
12
Id. (See chart providing explanations for ultrasound requirements by state.
Specifically, “[i]n Virginia and Wisconsin a woman who has been sexually
assaulted is not required to undergo the ultrasound.”).
13
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.10(D) (2016); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(4)(c) (West 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
253.10(3g)(2) (West 2016).
14
See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.001 (West 2003).
15
Timothy Zick, Professional Rights Speech, 47 Ariz. St. L.J. 1289, 1311
(2015).
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guise of informed consent, premised on the notion that, without the
description conveyed during an ultrasound, women are not fully
informed about their abortion procedure. 16 However, the laws in
Louisiana, Texas, and Wisconsin, where a clinician is required to
describe the fetus during the ultrasound, arguably represent a
dangerous departure from the common law of informed consent by
not allowing women to decline the description.17 In other words,
women are not able to determine for themselves what information
is material – or not – to their consent or to refuse information the
state has deemed relevant to their decision-making.
For example, Louisiana law requires all women to have an
ultrasound “at least twenty-four hours” prior to any abortion
procedure.18 The law articulates that the clinician must “display the
screen which depicts the active ultrasound images so that the
pregnant woman may view them” and “make audible the fetal
heartbeat.”19 However, the woman is not required to listen to the
fetal heartbeat or to view the ultrasound image.20 In contrast, the law
does specify that women are required to listen to a simultaneous
“oral explanation” of the fetus, including the “presence and location
of the unborn child,” “the dimensions of the unborn child,” and the
“presence of cardiac activity.”21 Prior to the ultrasound, the woman
16

See, e.g., Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and
the Path to a Protected Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351, 351 (2008).
17
For example, in Texas and Louisiana, women can decline the description
under limited circumstances, such as to abort a pregnancy following sexual
assault or rape if the woman first reports the assault to law enforcement. LA.
§ 40:1061.10(D)(6)(e) (Westlaw); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY § 171.022(d)(1)
(West 2011).
18
LA. § 40:1061.10(D)(2).
19
Id. § 40:1061.10(D)(2)(a).
20
Id.
21
Id. §§ 40:1061.10(D)(2)(a)-(b). The law does provide the opportunity for
“[p]regnant rape survivors or victims of crime against nature . . . who have
reported the act to law enforcement officials” to opt-out of this oral
description. Id. § 40:1061.10(D)(2)(e). However, given that one must first
report the rape or other crime to law enforcement officials, one might suspect
that few women who are obtaining an abortion after having experienced rape
or other trauma would be able to certify to the state that they fall within this
limited exception.
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must sign a state-created consent form, certifying that she
understands that she is “required by law to hear an oral explanation
of the ultrasound images.”22
Notably, throughout the Louisiana statute, the law frames all
of these requirements in terms of a woman’s positive rights. The
informed consent form states:
During this ultrasound examination, you have
the right to an oral explanation of the results. You
have the option to view the images on
the ultrasound screen . . . You have the right to
receive answers to any questions you ask about your
ultrasound examination. You have the right to
receive an ultrasound photographic print, which will
be provided at your request.23
This framing of the state’s requirements as a woman’s “options”
conforms to the notion that these laws enhance informed consent
and patient autonomy. Certainly, this framing conforms to the
rhetoric put forth by the legislature that these laws are intended to
“allow the patient to evaluate her condition and render her best
decision under difficult circumstances.” 24 Yet, this framing of a
woman’s positive right to hear may also potentially open the door
to the notion that the corollary right should also exist – a right not
to hear – based on the same premise that a patient should be
“[allowed] . . . to evaluate her condition and render her best
decision,” 25 which may include refusing specific information
during her decision-making process.26
Despite a great deal of attention focused on abortion-specific
informed consent laws, the constitutionality of mandatory

22

Id. § 40:1061.10(D)(2)(d).
Id. § 40:1061.10(D)(2)(e).
24
2012 La. Acts 685.
25
Texas Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570,
579 (5th Cir. 2012).
26
Corbin, supra note 7, at 955.
23

SHULMAN-LANIEL: A PATIENT’S RIGHT NOT TO HEAR: THE PUBLIC HEALTH CASE FOR CHALLENGING
PRE-ABORTION ULTRASOUND DESCRIPTION MANDATES BY REFOCUSING ON THE LISTENER

30

DEPAUL J. WOMEN, GEN & LAW

[Vol. VII: II

ultrasound description laws remains unclear. 27 The Supreme
Court’s decision in Whole Woman’s Health did not touch upon a
First Amendment analysis, as informed consent laws were not
raised by the Texas regulations in question. What Whole Woman’s
Health does provide for this discussion, however, is additional
guidance for how state abortion regulations should be interpreted by
the courts under the evolving “undue burden” standard.28
By striking down Texas’ so-called Targeted Regulation of
Abortion Provider (“TRAP”) laws,29 Whole Woman’s Health marks
only the second time the Supreme Court has interpreted abortion
regulations that predominantly use a “woman-protective
rationale.”30 As a result, its holding may have broad implications for
how to apply the “undue burden” standard and interpret the validity
of legislation that uses this type of “protective” rationale in the
future. As Justice Breyer described in his opinion, “[t]he rule
announced in Casey, . . . requires that courts consider the burdens a
law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits these laws

27

See Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S.
Ct. 2838 (2015); Nova Health Sys. v. Pruitt, 292 P.3d 28 (Okla. 2012), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 617 (2013); but see Texas Med. Providers Performing
Abortion Servs., 667 F.3d 570, 580 (5th Cir. 2012).
28
See Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016)
(citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992)).
29
See generally Rachel Benson Gold & Elizabeth Nash, TRAP Laws Gain
Political Traction While Abortion Clinics — And the Women They Serve—
Pay the Price, 16 No. 2 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 7, (Spring 2013)
(describing the rise of Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (“TRAP”)
laws that place onerous restrictions on abortion facilities and providers in the
name of protecting women).
30
Arguably, Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) also analyzed a law
predominantly based on “woman-protective” grounds, although the purported
protective purpose at issue in Carhart – which focused on the potential
psychological harm to women if the “partial birth abortion” ban were lifted –
is not as central to the case as the protective purpose was in Whole Woman’s
Health. See Carhart, 550 U.S. at 29. See also Reva B. Siegel, The New
Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion
Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991 (2007) (describing the development of
“women-protective rationales” in abortion regulation.)
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confer.”31 He goes on to do just that, examining not only the ample
evidence that Texas’ regulations “place[d] a substantial obstacle in
the path of women seeking a previability abortion,”32 but also the
distinct lack of evidence to support Texas’ assertion that these
regulations would improve women’s health. 33 Justice Breyer
“conclude[d] that neither [of the law’s] provisions offers medical
benefits sufficient to justify the burdens upon access that each
imposes.”34
Similar to the TRAP laws at issue in Whole Woman’s
Health, there is likely little evidence to support the usefulness of
ultrasound description mandates to improve women’s health. It is
not clear that states would be able to provide evidence to
demonstrate that these laws serve their purported goal of improving
women’s understanding of abortion prior to undergoing the
procedure. What may be less clear than with TRAP laws, however,
is whether ultrasound description mandates impede access to
abortion, thereby still constituting an undue burden in light of no
beneficial evidence. 35 Hence, while Whole Woman’s Health
provides a helpful basis for understanding how the Court may look
to laws that espouse a woman-protective rationale in the future, it
does not provide a clear answer for whether ultrasound description
31

Whole Women’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 88798).
32
Id. at 2296.
33
Id. at 2311 (“We have found nothing in Texas’ record evidence that shows
that, compared to prior law (which required a ‘working arrangement’ with a
doctor with admitting privileges), the new law advanced Texas’ legitimate
interest in protecting women’s health. We add that, when directly asked at
oral argument whether Texas knew of a single instance in which the new
requirement would have helped even one woman obtain better treatment,
Texas admitted that there was no evidence in the record of such a case.”).
34
Id. at 2300.
35
Ultrasound description mandates may, in fact, impede access to abortion
care, in part by, in effect, requiring an additional waiting period prior to the
abortion procedure (a wait that may be a substantial obstacle for many
women, particularly those who may need to travel long distances for care).
The ultrasound may also provide a financial barrier to women seeking
abortion care. Ultimately, there is not yet enough evidence to know whether
these barriers rise to the level of the undue burden standard expanded upon
by Whole Woman’s Health.
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mandates would likely be struck down by the Court as an “undue
burden” on women’s access to abortion. Moreover, the Court in
Whole Woman’s Health provides no guidance for how the First
Amendment questions implicated by ultrasound description
mandates should be interpreted.
Prior to the holding in Whole Woman’s Health, however,
several courts used the previous guidance from Casey to analyze the
constitutionality of ultrasound description mandates.36 In particular,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit enjoined the
enforcement of North Carolina’s ultrasound description mandate,
claiming that the compelled physician speech is “ideological in
intent and in kind” and represents a violation of the First
Amendment. 37 In Texas, however, the Fifth Circuit held that a
similar law did not violate the “undue burden” standard established
by Casey, allowing the Texas legislature to continue to require that
women seeking abortions first be required to hear an oral
description during their mandated pre-abortion ultrasound.38 Again,
the court focused on the patient’s rights as only tangential to the
clinician’s, emphasizing that the Texas law does not violate a
physician’s First Amendment right not to speak, but providing little
analysis as to whether the law may violate an undefined right of the
patient not to hear.39
III.

ESTABLISHING A PATIENT’S RIGHT NOT TO HEAR

Legal advocates have struggled with how to counter the
wave of state legislation that regulates – and arguably restricts –
abortion access by requiring pre-abortion ultrasounds. 40 While
36

See, e.g., Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 256 (4th Cir. 2014), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 2838 (2015); Nova Health Sys. v. Pruitt, 292 P.3d 28, 29
(Okla. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 617 (2013). See also, Stuart v.
Loomis, 992 F. Supp. 2d 585 (M.D.N.C. 2014).
37
Camnitz, 774 F.3d at 242.
38
Texas Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570,
576 (5th Cir. 2012).
39
Id. at 583.
40
See generally, e.g., Silbey, supra note 9, at 45; and Suter, supra note 5, at
27.
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Whole Woman’s Health may open the door to new challenges of
“speech and display” laws, 41 prior to this case, advocates and
scholars had been generally pessimistic about whether ultrasound
requirements may be successfully struck down as an “undue
burden” on a woman’s ability to access abortion services.42 In part,
this pessimism arose because the Casey Court upheld a
Pennsylvania abortion-specific informed consent requirement that
compels physician speech and, in doing so, provided little guidance
to lower courts about how they should analyze these types of laws.43
This pessimism persists because lower courts have consistently
“[reproduced] the idea [from Casey] that abortion has negative
mental health consequences while finding mandatory speech
requirements do not burden a woman’s access to abortion.” 44 In
fact, Casey arguably was critical in opening the floodgates for a
broader variety of restrictions on access to abortion services, leading
scholars and advocates to re-envision how ultrasound description
mandates can be struck down through means other than the “undue
burden” standard,45 and leading some to focus on whether the everevolving First Amendment doctrine may more effectively strike
down these restrictions as violations of a health professional’s right
not to speak.46
With this notion of a professional’s right against compelled
speech, though, also comes the corollary notion of the right against
compelled listening.47 As Caroline Mala Corbin notes in one of the
41

See supra Part II.
See, e.g., Gaylord & Maloney, supra note 5, at 645–46; see also Aziza
Ahmed, Informed Decision Making and Abortion: Crisis Pregnancy Centers,
Informed Consent, and the First Amendment, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 51, 55
(2015) (citing Caitlin E. Borgmann, Abortion, the Undue Burden Standard,
and the Evisceration of Women’s Privacy, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
291, 291 (2009)).
43
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992) (“If
the information the State requires to be made available to the woman is
truthful and not misleading, the requirement may be permissible.”); see also
Suter, supra note 5, at 22.
44
Ahmed, supra note 41, at 55 (citing Borgmann, supra note 41, at 291).
45
See, e.g., id.
46
See, e.g., Corbin, supra note 7, at 941.
47
Id. at 940.
42
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few scholarly texts to explore the patient’s right not to hear: “While
the right to speak, the right to listen, and the right against being
compelled to speak are well-established First Amendment rights,
free speech jurisprudence has not yet recognized a ‘right against
compelled listening.’” 48 Even though there has been much more
attention paid to the First Amendment rights of doctors than to the
First Amendment rights of patients, Corbin asserts that the notion
of a right against compelled listening is also strongly supported by
the values underlying the First Amendment, including the
promotion of autonomy, self-determination, self-realization, and the
marketplace of ideas.49 As Corbin writes, “without both a listener
and a speaker, freedom of expression is as empty as the sound of
one hand clapping.” 50 Corbin’s analysis focuses on some of the
theoretical principles, further described below, including the
applicability of the “captive audience” doctrine. What Corbin fails
to do, however, is establish how the right against compelled
listening would not only potentially provide a stronger foundation
for striking down ultrasound description mandates, but how it would
do so in a manner that bolsters informed consent law and the
necessary value of the doctor-patient relationship within public
health law more generally.51
How, then, might one establish this right against compelled
listening for women during pre-abortion ultrasounds?
Unfortunately, there is little doctrine from which to draw this right.
In fact, one recent case, McCullen v. Coakley, indicates that the
Supreme Court may, in fact, have explicitly rejected the notion of a
First Amendment right not to hear in 2014.52 In McCullen, the Court

48

Id.
See, e.g., id. at 942; and see, Ellen Camburn, Doctor-Patient-State
Relationship: The Problem with Informed Consent and State Mandated
Ultrasounds Prior to Abortions, 10 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 301, 311
(2013).
50
Corbin, supra note 7, at 965 (citing Rodney A. Smolla, Freedom of Speech
for Libraries and Librarians, 85 LAW. LIBR. J. 71, 77 (1993)).
51
See infra Part IV.
52
McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2545–46 (2014) (“Protecting people
from speech they do not want to hear is not a function that the First
49
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struck down, on First Amendment grounds, a Massachusetts statute
that prohibited individuals from “knowingly [standing] on a ‘public
way or sidewalk’ within 35 feet of . . . any place, other than a
hospital, where abortions are performed.” 53 However, the
circumstances facing the patient in the context of pre-abortion
ultrasound description mandates can be substantially distinguished
from the circumstances in McCullen in two primary ways. It is
within these distinct circumstances that the right against compelled
listening can begin to be situated.
First, in the pre-abortion ultrasound context, the listener
(i.e., the patient) is subjected to government-compelled professional
speech within the context of a clinician-patient relationship, not the
speech within a public forum at issue in McCullen. Second, the
listener is exposed to the “uncomfortable message” that she may not
want to hear not on “the public streets and sidewalks,” where one
may not reasonably expect privacy (as in McCullen),54 but in the
intimate and confined setting of a doctor’s office. She is often held
figuratively “captive” by the stirrups holding her feet or by the
ultrasound wand across her torso and unable to avoid the speech in
question without leaving the appointment and, should she still seek
an abortion, without leaving the state where the law is enacted. The
next sub-sections examine the limited, though evolving, doctrine
around each of these distinctions, including a discussion of
professional speech and the beginnings of case law that lay a
rhetorical foundation for the recognition of a listener’s rights. As
described below, the captive nature of the interaction implicated by
ultrasound description mandates is sufficiently distinct from the
public spaces about which Chief Justice Roberts wrote in McCullen.
This distinction may thereby implicate the “captive audience”
doctrine to establish that patients in medical settings, where there is
little or no opportunity to simply avoid the speech, may have a First
Amendment right not to listen.

Amendment allows the government to undertake in the public streets and
sidewalks.”).
53
Id. at 2525 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266, §§ 120E1/2(a), (b) (West
2012)).
54
Id. at 2529.
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A. Bridging the First Amendment Rights of Professionals
and Patients
As mentioned, one primary way to distinguish McCullen is
to note the identity of the speaker. The Court’s holding in McCullen,
when read narrowly, refutes a right against compelled listening
when the First Amendment rights of private speakers outweigh the
potential rights of the listener.55 In the case of abortion informed
consent, however, courts must now grapple with the simultaneous
rights of the patient-as-listener and the rights of the physician-asspeaker, compelled by the state to speak. 56 Unlike in McCullen,
these rights are not inherently at odds, but are instead often aligned
in the interest of forming and promoting a physician-patient
relationship in the context of medical care. The professional’s
rights, then, should not only be viewed as in conflict with, but rather
strengthened by, the listener’s right to determine what to hear.57

55

Id. at 2541.
See, e.g., Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 246 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied,
135 S. Ct. 2838 (2015) (“Compelled speech is particularly suspect because it
can directly affect listeners as well as speakers. Listeners may have difficulty
discerning that the message is the state's, not the speaker's, especially where
the ‘speaker [is] intimately connected with the communication advanced.’”)
(quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. Of Bos., 515 U.S.
557, 576 (1995)); see also, e.g., Texas Med. Providers Performing Abortion
Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 573, 579 (5th Cir. 2012) (“. . . whereas Casey
only required the physician to make certain materials about childbirth and the
fetus ‘available’ to the woman, the physician here is required to explain the
results of sonogram and fetal heart auscultation, and the woman is required to
listen to the sonogram results.”).
57
This is in contrast to what Paula Berg describes as Casey’s understanding
of a patient’s right against compelled listening. Berg noted that “the Court
characterized and decided [Casey] as if it involved a bipartite conflict between
physicians' right to speak and states' right to regulate professionals, rather than
a tripartite conflict among physicians' speech rights, government's power to
regulate professionals, and patients' audience-based right to receive
information.” Paula Berg, Toward a First Amendment Theory of Doctor-Patient Discourse and the Right to Receive Unbiased Medical Advice, 74
B.U. L. REV. 201, 220 (1994).
56
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This starting point – the rights of the physician-as-speaker –
admittedly provides an unstable foundation. As numerous scholars
and courts have noted, the doctrine around professional speech is
“murky” at best.58 Therefore, determining which standard of review
should be applied to professional speech and how such standard
should be applied is far from a settled area of law.59
Generally, it is accepted – largely through the common law
doctrine of informed consent – that “the state may freely regulate
physician speech as part of its regulation of the practice of
medicine.” 60 Yet, “[t]he Supreme Court has said relatively little
about the First Amendment’s coverage of professional advice and
communications.”61 Ultimately, the lower courts have only “cryptic
guidance” on how to “make sense” of professional speech
regulations.62 There is still uncertainty regarding whether the state
exceeds its power to protect public health when it “[requires]
physicians to engage in ideological speech,” and whether and when
the state may “[require] physicians to communicate information that
the medical profession regards as false, or prohibits physicians from
communicating information that the medical professional regards as
true.” 63 This question, while complex, is ultimately beyond the
scope of this article.
Regardless of the instability of the professional speech
doctrine, the professional identity of the speaker in the context of
state-mandated ultrasound description provides a starting point for
establishing a listener’s First Amendment rights against compelled
58

Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 814 F.3d 1159, 1186 (11th Cir. 2015),
vacated, 2016 WL 2959373 (Feb. 3, 2016).
59
See, e.g., Post, supra note 5, at 944; Suter, supra note 5, at 23; Zick, supra
note 15, at 1296 (“Lower courts have been left to divine a doctrine from
concurrences, brief snippets in plurality opinions, and precedents in which
professional speech was regulated but no doctrinal framework
materialized.”). See also, e.g., Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125
YALE L.J. 1238, 1241 (2016) (“What is strikingly – and perhaps somewhat
surprisingly – still absent from the case law and the legal literature is a
comprehensive theory of professional speech.”).
60
Post, supra note 5, at 939.
61
Zick, supra note 15, at 1291.
62
Id.
63
Post, supra note 5, at 939.
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listening in a context quite distinct from the context at issue in
McCullen.64
It is the unique character of the professional-listener
relationship, and in particular, the doctor-patient relationship, that
has created the need for not only an informed consent doctrine, but
also for a recognition and a valuing of a patient’s right not to hear.
As Claudia Haupt describes in her recent article on professional
speech, professional speech is of a distinct character. 65 Haupt
explains how “‘learned’ professionals,” including doctors, form
“knowledge communities,” “communities whose principle raison
d’être is the generation and dissemination of knowledge.”66 These
knowledge communities fundamentally re-shape how one thinks
about regulating professional spaces and professional relationships.
“Sometimes,” Haupt writes, “regulation aligns with” the collective
“professional insights” of a knowledge community, but at other
times, it “contradicts them.”67 Still, the uniqueness of the learned
professions as knowledge communities “informs” both how one
justifies the “First Amendment protection” of professional speech,
as well as “the limits of that protection, the permissibility of
regulating the professions” through licensure and other
mechanisms, “and the imposition and extent of tort liability for
professional malpractice.” 68 In particular, the existence of these
knowledge communities (built around professional consensus and
specialized knowledge) fundamentally reshapes how one regulates
the transmission of knowledge from professional to layperson, from
doctor to patient, from speaker to listener. As Haupt explains,
“Professionals speak not only for themselves but also as members

64

Haupt, supra note 59, at 1259 (“[T]he doctrinal basis of professional speech
appears indeterminate at best. But a wide-angle view reveals that, despite the
initial lack of clarity in Casey, the Court seems to have at least a hunch that
speech communicated by professionals in a professional-client relationship
for the purpose of providing professional advice is somehow distinctive.”).
65
Id. at 1241.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 1245.
68
Id. at 1238.
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of a learned profession: they ‘assist[] individuals in making personal
choices based on the cumulative knowledge of the profession.’”69
Building on the professional’s distinctive role, as described
by Haupt, the listener – the patient – also has distinct autonomy
interests; these interests are exacerbated by the inherent power
imbalance within the doctor-patient relationship. Unlike the patient
who may walk through the crowd of protestors in McCullen, the
patient in a doctor’s office may depend upon dialogue with a
professional in order to make an informed decision. 70 These
“decisional autonomy interests,” as Haupt describes them, 71 are
unique. Professional speech – unlike lay speech – by its very nature
“implicates the autonomy interests of both the speaker and the
listener.”72 Building on the notion of knowledge communities, the
professional-listener relationship or the physician-patient
relationship is “characterized by an asymmetry of knowledge.”73
The patient is seeking professional speech “precisely because of this
asymmetry.”74
Informed consent has long been chosen as the legal
mechanism to “fix” this asymmetry. 75 But in the context of
ultrasound description mandates, this asymmetry also demands
something broader: the recognition of a listener’s agency and,
ultimately, a listener’s rights to receive or deny information. In the
context of any doctor-patient relationship, the patient is vulnerable
and often disempowered.76 Dependent on the doctor’s professional
69

Id. at 1242 (citing Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional
Speech, and the Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev.
771, 773 (1999)).
70
Haupt, supra note 59, at 1243.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id. (emphasis added).
74
Id.
75
See Zick, supra note 15, at 1352 (“States are rightly concerned about the
asymmetries of power and information that inhere in professional client
relationships. Malpractice and informed consent laws seek to account for such
concerns.”).
76
See Berg, supra note 57, at 227 (“Patients' lack of power within the
structure of the doctor-patient relationship leads to passivity and a reluctance
to question or challenge physicians. [citation omitted] A large body of
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guidance and the knowledge community’s insights, the patient
relies on a physician’s speech to determine her choices and to come
to an informed decision. 77 In the context of a doctor-patient
relationship in which the state can dictate specific physician speech,
the patient’s vulnerabilities are deepened. Her interests “are only
served if the professional communicates information that is accurate
(under the knowledge community’s current assessment), reliable,
and personally tailored to the specific situation of the listener.”78
State-mandated professional speech, such as ultrasound
abortion mandates, runs afoul of these interests, replacing the
knowledge community’s assessment of a listener’s needs and the
critical discourse between a physician and patient79 with a specific
and standardized state message, amplified through the mouthpiece
of the physician and without recognition of listener agency. In so
doing, it exacerbates the imbalance of the doctor-patient
relationship and ignores the distinct speech rights of the listener. It
replaces not only the professional’s autonomy and independent
judgment with the state’s judgment, but with it, it replaces the
patient’s decisional autonomy. 80 Regardless of the professional
research has demonstrated that patients rarely ask questions during
conversations with physicians or take control of topics that are discussed.”).
77
See id. at 224 (“Patient/clients form professional relationships because they
lack the information needed to make a rational decision on their own about a
problem that is within the professional's area of expertise. The goal of this
relationship is to identify the patient/client's particular needs and interests and
to obtain expert advice about the most appropriate course of action.”).
78
Haupt, supra note 59, at 1271.
79
See Berg, supra note 57, at 235–36 (“When a patient . . . must decide on a
course of treatment, the ‘marketplace of ideas’ that informs his or her decision
making is provided mainly by physicians. In conversations with physicians,
patients seek to discover the nature of the medical problem . . . Patients'
discovery of their medical truth – that is, of the particular course of treatment
that is best for them – depends on an unconstrained flow of information from
physicians.”).
80
Haupt, supra note 59, at 1271–72 (“As Justice Stevens pointed out in his
opinion in Casey, ‘[d]ecisional autonomy must limit the State’s power to
inject into a woman’s most personal deliberations its own views of what is
best.’ ” (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 916 (1992)).
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speech rights at issue, without a recognition of a patient’s right to
demand information or to refuse information, both the
professional’s and the patient’s agency are put into question.
The listener’s interests are then implicated by the unique
nature of professional speech and by the unique dynamics of the
professional-patient relationship. “Compelling physician speech,
like silencing it, implicates both doctors’ right to speak and patients’
right to receive information.”81 Patients have an “audience-based
interest in receiving information from their physicians;” 82 by
regulating physician speech, regardless of the validity of the
regulation, the state inevitably impacts the rights of the listener, and
these restrictions should be analyzed as such.
In recent years, in addition to the scholarly analysis, various
courts have struggled with how to balance the rights of the state, of
professionals, and of patients in the context of “[s]tate regulations
of professional speech [that] have become more prevalent, more
politically tinged, and more likely to structure and dictate the
specific content of professional-client interactions.” 83 From
multiple cases that uphold restrictions on “sexual orientation change
efforts” (SOCE) counseling84 to a case that upholds restrictions on
physicians’ ability to discuss firearm access and safety, 85 lower
courts have recently been faced with determining how and whether
to recognize a patient’s right to listen or to avoid listening, and what
these patients’ rights may mean for regulations of professional

81

Berg, supra note 57, at 220.
Id.
83
Zick, supra note 15, at 1292.
84
Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1222 (9th Cir. 2014) (upholding
California’s law restricting the provision of SOCE therapy to minors as a
constitutional “regulation of professional conduct”); Doe ex rel. Doe v.
Governor of N.J., 783 F.3d 150, 151 (3d Cir. 2015) (upholding New Jersey’s
law restricting the provision of SOCE therapy to minors as a constitutional
regulation of professional speech).
85
Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida, 814 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2015),
vacated, 2016 WL 2959373 (Feb. 3, 2016).
82
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speech. 86 In the abortion context, too, from Rust v. Sullivan 87 to
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 88 the Supreme Court has more
86

See Zick, supra note 15, at 1294 (arguing that “[r]ecently enacted
professional speech regulations do not merely interfere with the transmission
and receipt of expert knowledge, transgress patients' and professionals' rights
to receive or impart information about medical care, or implicate the activities
of ‘knowledge communities’ . . . They are troublesome for a related but
distinctive reason. These regulations suppress, alter, or dictate professional
rights speech—professional client communications about, concerning, or
relating to the recognition, scope, or exercise of constitutional rights.”).
87
In Rust, the Court ultimately found that regulations that prohibited
recipients of Title X funding from “counseling, referral, and the provision of
information regarding abortion as a method of family planning” did not
violate physician’s First Amendment rights. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,
193 (1991). However, the Rust Court also recognized that the regulations in
question “d[id] not significantly impinge upon the doctor-patient
relationship,” in part, because the regulations did not affect all doctors or all
patients in a given jurisdiction. Id. at 200. In doing so, the Court quickly
acknowledges that a woman may at times have a “right to receive”
information about abortion. (“Under the [Title X] regulations . . . a doctor's
ability to provide, and a woman's right to receive, information concerning
abortion and abortion-related services outside the context of the Title X
project remains unfettered.”) Id. at 203. Despite this brief nod to a patient’s
potential rights, the Rust court largely ignores the patient’s “audience-based
interests.” See Berg, supra note 57, at 219–20 (“The unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, upon which the Rust Court based its analysis, balances
the government's need to make funding decisions against the constitutional
rights of government agents and employees while performing official duties.
The doctrine does not address the impact that funding restrictions may have
on the First Amendment rights of listeners who depend upon publicly
financed speakers for information. The Rust Court's reliance on the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions, rather than on the First Amendment rights of
patients, leads it to overlook the danger that restrictions on the speech of
publicly funded physicians pose to patients' audience-based interests.”).
88
The majority in Casey does not discuss a patient’s right not to listen, though
Justice Stevens, in his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part,
describes how “[w]henever government commands private citizens to speak
or to listen, careful review of the justification for that command is particularly
appropriate.” Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 921–22
(1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens
goes on to describe how, for many women, the information required by
Pennsylvania’s statute would be “clearly useless” and “thus constitute and
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indirectly wrestled with whether patients may have a right to receive
or reject information within doctor-patient relationships, though the
Court has only barely touched upon this question in each of these
cases. 89 Ultimately, while case law has not yet established that
listeners have a right to hear or not to hear, a set of recent cases have
begun to develop some rhetorical underpinnings for this type of
analysis, a rhetoric that, if applied to the ultrasound description
mandate context, may ultimately provide the critical discursive
nexus through which these regulations may be successfully struck
down.
For example, in a recent triad of vacated opinions named
Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida, the Eleventh Circuit
specifically grappled with whether patients should have a corollary
right to avoid professional speech.90 At issue in Wollschlaeger is a
Florida law, the Firearm Owner’s Privacy Act, which, in part,
restricts how and when health care providers can inquire about a
patient’s gun ownership or discuss firearm safety.91 The court has
unnecessary – and therefore undue – burden on the women’s constitutional
liberty . . .” Id. As Paula Berg writes about Casey, the majority “characterized
and decided the case as if it involved a bipartite conflict between physicians'
right to speak and states' right to regulate professionals, rather than a tripartite
conflict among physicians' speech rights, government's power to regulate
professionals, and patients' audience- based right to receive information.”
Berg, supra note 57, at 220.
89
Berg, supra note 57, at 219 (“[T]he Court [in Rust and in Casey] approaches
its analysis of government restrictions on the content of doctor-patient
discourse exclusively from the standpoint of their interference with
physicians' right to speak. The Court ignores that the regulation of physician
speech also impacts on patients' receipt of medical information.”).
90
In fact, the court grapples with this question again and again, as the case
has been vacated and superseded on rehearing three times since the matter
first came to the Eleventh Circuit in July of 2014. Wollschlaeger v. Governor
of Florida, 814 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2015), rev’d in part, vacated in part, 797
F. 3d 859 (11th Cir. 2014), vacated, 2016 WL 2959373 (Feb. 3, 2016).
91
Wollschlaeger, 814 F.3d at 1167–68 (“The Act seeks to protect patient
privacy by restricting irrelevant inquiry and record-keeping by physicians on
the sensitive issue of firearm ownership and by prohibiting harassment and
discrimination on the basis of firearm ownership. The Act does not prevent
physicians from speaking with patients about firearms generally. Nor does it
prohibit specific inquiry or recordkeeping about a patient’s firearm-
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now issued three different opinions in the case, all of which rely on
a different level of First Amendment scrutiny to analyze the
professional speech restriction,92 and all of which have been vacated
and superseded by the subsequent opinion. In each opinion,
however, the Eleventh Circuit upholds Florida’s restriction on
professional speech, concluding that a patient has a right to not have
to hear a doctor’s warnings or inquiries about gun ownership.93
Throughout its analysis, the Wollschlaeger court grounded
aspects of its decision in a depiction of the listener’s (the patient’s)
“powerlessness” and vulnerability.94 At the start of the more recent
opinion (decided in 2016 and since vacated), the Eleventh Circuit
quoted First Amendment scholar, Paula Berg, describing the unique
nature of the physician-patient relationship:
Society has traditionally accorded physicians a high
degree of deference due to their superior knowledge,
educational pedigree, position of prestige, and
“charismatic authority,” resulting from their
“symbolic role as conquerors of disease and death.” .
. . This deference reaches its apex in the examination
room where patients are in a position of relative
powerlessness. Patients must place their trust in the
physicians' guidance and submit to the physicians'
authority.95

ownership status when the physician determines in good faith, based on the
circumstances of that patient’s case, that such information is relevant to the
patient’s medical care or safety, or the safety of others.”).
92
The most recent opinion, since vacated, “pass[es] no judgment on what
level of scrutiny should apply here,” and instead concludes that “the Act
survives even strict scrutiny as the State has asserted a compelling interest
and the Act is narrowly tailored to advance that interest.” Id. at 1186.
93
Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida, 814 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2015),
vacated, 2016 WL 2959373 (Feb. 3, 2016); Wollschlaeger v. Governor of
Fla., 797 F.3d 859 (11th Cir. 2015); Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760
F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 2014).
94
Wollschlaeger, 814 F.3d at 1168.
95
Id. (quoting Berg, supra note 57, at 226).
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Throughout its opinion, the court builds upon this rhetoric of an
inherent power imbalance between physician and patient. The Act,
the court noted, was an extension of the long tradition of regulating
the doctor-patient relationship, with the ultimate goal of protecting
patients in the context of this asymmetry. 96 In the multiple
Wollschlaeger decisions, the court additionally centered its analyses
of a physician’s First Amendment rights around the patient’s
corollary rights, specifically focusing on the captive nature of the
patient, and how this contributes to the dynamic of physician-patient
speech. 97 “In such a situation,” the court wrote, “the balance of
power between doctor and patient will often make a patient feel as
if he has no choice but to listen and answer a doctor's questions,
especially when seeing another doctor may not be practicable, or
even possible.”98 By building its analysis from this notion of the
vulnerable patient, the Wollschlaeger court, despite its flaws, 99
began to provide a basis for conceptualizing how a patient’s rights
to listen/not to listen may be at the very foundation of analyzing
regulations of professional speech.
Another set of cases analyzing the constitutionality of bans
on sexual-orientation change efforts counseling (“SOCE”) has also
begun to grapple with the question of whether First Amendment
doctrine provides for a corollary right for patients to listen or to
refuse to listen. For example, in Doe ex rel. Doe v. Governor of New
96

Wollschlaeger, 797 F.3d at 868 (“To protect patients, society has long
imposed upon physicians’ certain duties and restrictions that define the
boundaries of good medical care. In keeping with this tradition, the State
passed the Act.”).
97
See, e.g., Wollschlaeger, 814 F.3d at 1198 (“This [doctor-patient]
relationship is not conducted in an open forum; it takes place behind the
closed doors of the examination room. As such, a doctor will usually have a
captive audience of one: the patient . . . . In these moments of vulnerability,
patients could hardly be expected to affirmatively rebuff their doctors by
demanding all non-medically relevant questioning cease.”).
98
Id. at 1200.
99
The court in Wollschlaeger fails to recognize, for example, that physicians
are not necessarily able to determine the required relevance of a discussion
about firearms with a patient if the inquiry itself is restricted by law. Yet, if
physicians do not inquire, patients are simply never given the important
opportunity to reject or to request the professional speech.
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Jersey,100 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a New Jersey
statute that restricted state-licensed counselors from providing
minors with SOCE therapy.101 In Doe, unlike in Wollschlaeger,102
the plaintiffs are not the potential professional speakers, but instead
the potential listeners, the patients.103 The Doe plaintiffs, a minor
and his parents, challenged New Jersey’s legislation, in part, by
asserting that the law burdened their First Amendment right to
receive information.104
While the Third Circuit ultimately concluded that the
legislation neither violated the “[professional’s] right to speak” nor
the patient’s “right to receive information,”105 it began to slightly
open the door for rhetoric surrounding how the First Amendment
may protect both the speaker and the listener.106 In part, the court,
throughout its discussion, recognized that there may be, in certain
contexts, a right for patients to listen.107 While the court ultimately
determined that the reciprocal right to listen, to receive information,
is not violated in the instant case, the court arguably did so
clumsily. 108 Instead of providing an analysis for why the patient
does not independently have a right to listen, the court simply found
100

Doe ex rel. Doe v. Governor of New Jersey, 783 F.3d 150, 151 (3d Cir.
2015).
101
Id.
102
Wollschlaeger, 814 F.3d at 1167.
103
Doe, 783 F.3d at 154.
104
Id. at 155.
105
Id.
106
Id. (“Appellants are correct that the First Amendment protects both the
speaker and the recipient of information.” (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharm.
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756–57 (1976))).
107
Doe, 783 F.3d at 154.
108
After establishing that the Doe court believes that a patient’s right to
listen/not to listen does exist, the only analysis provided in Doe about why it
fails to recognize a right to listen in the legislation at-issue here is provided
by the following: “We are not suggesting that Appellants do not have the right
to receive the information for the reason that the legislature enacted A3371,
which bars the provision of SOCE counseling to minors; rather, Appellants'
right to receive the information is not violated because we already
upheld A3371, which bans the provision of SOCE counseling to minors,
against a constitutional challenge in King.” Id. at 155–56.
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that, by upholding the ban on clinician speech, the simultaneous ban
on the listener’s ability to receive SOCE information is also upheld.
Because the professional’s First Amendment rights are not violated
by the statute, the court argued, neither are the patient’s.109
As applied to ultrasound description mandates, this myopic
understanding of listener’s rights as being contingent upon
speaker’s rights is problematic. As previously described,
professional speech doctrine makes it unclear whether laws that
compel physician “speech and display” mandates will successfully
be struck down on First Amendment grounds. But what Doe and
Wollschlaeger do provide is the potential beginnings for rhetorical
analysis of what courts are now beginning to accept: that in the
unique and, in many ways, strange contexts of professional-patient
relationships, there may be a right for patients to listen or to refuse
to listen.
While the courts in Doe and Wollschlaeger come out
differently in their analyses of whether a patient may have a right to
hear or deny information that the state has determined is harmful,
both cases begin to provide a framework for re-imagining the First
Amendment rights of both doctor and patient, opening the door for
a patients’ right against compelled listening in the case of preabortion ultrasound descriptions. While these opinions provide little
doctrinal certainty, they can be observed as potential forays into
how courts may be able to move towards incorporating an analysis
of the rights of a patient into analyses of the First Amendment rights
of professionals. As will later be discussed, however, these cases
provide for a potentially problematic precedent for public health law
more broadly, and Wollschlaeger’s broader holding and analysis, in
particular, is flawed, at best. Still, in grounding some of their
discussion in listeners’ rights, these cases may allow for another
rhetorical avenue for advancing women’s rights against compelled
listening in the context of abortion informed consent.
B. The “Captive” Patient
An additional way to distinguish the McCullen Court’s
rejection of the “right not to hear” is to recognize that the context in
109

Doe, 783 F.3d at 155-56.
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which ultrasound descriptions are required may uniquely implicate
the “captive audience” doctrine. As the previous section
demonstrates, there is little doctrine explicitly promoting a general
First Amendment right against compelled listening, and the existing
analysis is fairly preliminary. For this reason, ultrasound description
mandates may, in fact, be better analyzed by applying the captive
audience doctrine to doctor-patient interactions.
The captive audience doctrine is one of the few ways that
the law recognizes some First Amendment protection for both
speakers and listeners. 110 As the court in Wollschlaeger states,
“[a]lthough the First Amendment usually requires that the burden
of avoiding unwanted speech be placed on the listener, the captiveaudience doctrine applies in certain instances where the listener
cannot avoid being exposed to that speech.”111 Even when speakers
have a right to communicate, a listener’s legal rights may be
balanced against a speaker’s rights; 112 in this way, the captive
audience doctrine may provide an answer for how to address
ultrasound description mandates even if the compelled speech does
not violate the First Amendment rights of the professional. If a
listener is “unwilling,” the captive-audience doctrine finds that
speakers may not “foist” their speech onto the listener.113 “Instead,
the government may restrict such speech if ‘substantial privacy
interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.’”114
The setting in which the speech occurs is a central
component in analyzing this doctrine. 115 Unlike the listener in
McCullen v. Coakley, the listener on an ultrasound table in a
physician’s office is in a physically vulnerable and captive state,
unable to easily escape the government’s message – as
communicated through the physician – should she refuse to listen.
110

See, e.g., Corbin, supra note 7, at 941; Marcy Strauss, Redefining the
Captive Audience Doctrine, 19 HASTING CONST. L. QUARTERLY 85, 108–09
(1992).
111
Wollschlaeger, 814 F.3d at 1199 (citing Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443,
459 (2011); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210–11 (1975)).
112
Corbin, supra note 7, at 941.
113
Id. at 943.
114
Id.
115
McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014).
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As Chief Justice Roberts states in McCullen, “[on public streets and
sidewalks], a listener often encounters speech he might otherwise
tune out” and the captive audience doctrine need not be applied.116
In contrast, in labor settings or in the privacy of one’s home,117 the
captive audience doctrine may apply if the listener “cannot readily
avoid the message.”118
While the Supreme Court has not readily applied the captive
audience doctrine to medical settings, 119 scholars and the courts
have preliminarily suggested such an application. 120 Certainly,
given the expectation of privacy within medical facilities along with
the right to make one’s own health-care decisions, the captive
audience doctrine should be applied to these settings in order to
protect the patient from unwanted speech. Listeners in a medical
environment should not reasonably be “expected to leave in order
to avoid unwanted speech”121 nor should listeners be “held ‘captive’
by medical circumstance[].”122
In addition to recognizing the nature of the setting, in
applying the captive audience doctrine, courts analyze the extent to
which the listener can simply avoid their “captivity.”123 First, courts
look to whether the listener can readily avoid the unwanted
speech.124 In other words, the listener must show “that a substantial
116

Id.
See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 110, at 95; Paul M. Secunda, Toward the
Viability of State-Based Legislation to Address Workplace Captive Audience
Meetings in the United States, 29 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 209, 214 (2008).
118
Corbin, supra note 7, at 942.
119
Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc. 512 U.S. 753, 768 (1995) (citing
Operation Rescue v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 626 So. 2d 664, 673 (Fla.
1993)) (discussing how a patient may be “held ‘captive’ by medical
circumstances.”). The Court in Madsen does not, however, explicitly hold that
the captive audience doctrine can or should be applied to medical settings.
120
See, e.g., id. at 781; Corbin, supra note 7, at 947; Wollschlaeger, 814 F.3d
at 1199 (“The captive-audience doctrine has special force in confrontational
settings and in cases regarding access to medical facilities.”). But see
McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014).
121
Corbin, supra note 7, at 946.
122
Madsen, 512 U.S. at 678 (citing Operation Rescue, 626 So.2d at 673).
123
See Corbin, supra note 7, at 944.
124
See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988).
117
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privacy interest is ‘being invaded in an essentially intolerable’
way.”125 Second, courts note that the listener must “not have to quit
the space to avoid the message.”126 As the Eleventh Circuit stated
in one of the vacated opinions in Wollschlaeger, “while offensive
speech cannot be curtailed just because a listener does not wish to
hear it, that general rule does not extend so far as to include speech
‘so intrusive that the unwilling audience cannot avoid it’”127
Applying these principles to ultrasound description
mandates, it would be difficult for the state to demonstrate that the
audience in question (i.e., the patient) would be able to “readily
avoid” the physician’s speech.128 For one, more so than in other
settings where the captive audience doctrine has been recognized,
the audience in question is physically required to hear the
government message 129 because the ultrasound mandates require
“simultaneous” descriptions. This means that while the patient is
likely in a hospital gown, stirrups, or with her abdomen exposed and
touched by the “speaker,” she is simultaneously listening to the
doctor orally describe the ultrasound image as it appears.130
Beyond physical captivity, a woman is additionally captive
to the legal requirements that she must face prior to obtaining a
procedure she has determined she needs. A woman comes to her
125

Wollschlaeger, 814 F.3d at 1199 (citing Snyder, 562 U.S. at 459).
Corbin, supra note 7, at 944 (citing J.M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile
Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295, 2312 (1999)); see also
Wollschlaeger, 814 F.3d at 1199 (citing Snyder, 562 U.S. at 459).
127
Wollschlaeger, 814 F.3d at 1200 (citing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703,
716 (2000)) (emphasis added).
128
See Berg, supra note 57, at 256 (describing how patients may be captive
to government-mandated messages within the context of the physician-patient
relationship. “Once in the presence of a physician, substantial physical and
psychological barriers make government- mandated messages extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to ignore. While patients can simply discard
printed materials, they have ‘no choice but to sit and listen, or perhaps to sit
and to try not to listen’ when the state's message is communicated orally.”).
129
See Corbin, supra note 7, at 943.
130
See Silbey, supra note 9, at 25–26 (describing how “[s]ubmitting to a
vaginal ultrasound and being forced to listen to and see the results of an
ultrasound while physically restrained in stirrups and undressed from the
waist down is degrading.”).
126
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doctor seeking an abortion and she is first required to listen to an
ultrasound description and to certify on an informed consent form
that she has done so, all prior to obtaining the care that she seeks. In
order to achieve her goal of obtaining an abortion, she is certainly,
by law, unable to avoid the speech in question. If she is forced to
“quit the space to avoid the message,” 131 she also forgoes any
opportunity to obtain abortion care in her state. The physical and
legal circumstances in which she finds herself create captivity.
One major limitation of applying the captive-audience
doctrine to the ultrasound mandate context is that this doctrine
traditionally applies to private speakers.132 In the abortion context,
while the physician may at times be the “mouthpiece” of the state,133
the speaker’s identity is more analogous to a private speaker than a
government speaker, particularly when viewed from the listener’s
perspective. That said, even if the professional speaker in this
context is seen as a government-speaker, when the “government’s
message crosses over from available to required viewing,” the
captive audience doctrine may still apply.134
C. The Intrusive Nature of Troubling Information
Building on the captive audience doctrine, it is also
necessary to recognize that not only are the circumstances of
speech consequential to whether a regulation of speech survives
constitutional analysis, but, as the Supreme Court made clear in
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.,135 the particularly troubling nature
of the message being conveyed may also factor into a First
Amendment analysis of a listener’s rights.136 In Went For It, the
Court analyzed a set of Florida Bar rules, which prohibited lawyers
from soliciting “personal injury or wrongful death” clients through

131

Corbin, supra note 7, at 944 (citing Balkin, supra note 125, at 2312).
Id. at 942.
133
Stuart v. Loomis, 992 F.Supp.2d 585, 609 (M.D.N.C. 2014).
134
Camburn, supra note 49, at 311.
135
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
136
Id. at 638–39 (citing Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 542 (1980)).
132
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direct mail within 30 days of an “accident or disaster.”137 The Court
held that the restriction on speech was constitutionally valid.138
While Went for It is distinct in many ways from the
ultrasound description mandates at issue here, Went For It’s
analysis may, in part, be applicable because of the Court’s emphasis
on the role of the effect of the speech on the listener in its analysis
of whether or not to uphold this speech restriction. In part, the Court
looked to one of the substantial government interests asserted by the
petitioners – a concern for “protecting the privacy and tranquility of
personal injury victims and their loved ones against intrusive,
unsolicited contact by lawyers . . .” (emphasis added). 139 In
particular, the Court cited the petitioners’ brief and petition for
certiorari, which stated, “[b]ecause direct-mail solicitations in the
wake of accidents are perceived by the public as intrusive . . . the
reputation of the legal profession in the eyes of Floridians has
suffered commensurately.”140
Applying this analysis, it becomes even clearer that a right
against compelled listening may exist in the pre-abortion ultrasound
description context. In Went For It, the law at issue restricts visual
messages conveyed through direct mail, with the notion that
receiving mail at one’s home while the recipient is in a vulnerable
emotional state is “intrusive.”141 The Court even cited “empirical
evidence” from a summary report, prepared by the Florida Bar,
about the public’s feelings of these types of direct-mail solicitations
and the anger that these direct mail solicitations prompted. 142 The
Court noted that “the harm targeted by the Bar” (the direct mail
solicitation) “cannot be eliminated by a brief journey to the trash
can.”143
While not all women seeking abortions are in a fragile
emotional state at the time of a pre-abortion ultrasound, the
137

Id. at 620.
Id.
139
Id. at 624 (citing Brief for Petitioner at 8, 25–27).
140
Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 624 (citing Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1415; Brief for Petitioner at 28-29).
141
Id.
142
Id. at 631-32, 626-27.
143
Id. at 631.
138
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circumstances and captivity in which a woman may be required to
view the fetus, hear its heartbeat, etc. may render these messages
emotionally intrusive.144 As in Went For It, the act of listening to
the state’s message, as it is conveyed by the physician, may not
simply be solved by “a brief journey to the trash can” or being
forced to forget what one has just seen or been told. By the state’s
design, these messages are meant to impact the woman as she makes
(or confirms) her decision to have an abortion. The troubling nature
of these messages may have a lasting and harmful impact.
IV.

SHIFTING THE DISCOURSE TOWARDS A PATIENT’S RIGHT
NOT TO HEAR

The notion of a First Amendment right against compelled
listening has not yet been established, nor is the argument for
establishing this right robust enough to withstand the current
Supreme Court’s analysis.145 Still, the discourse around ultrasound
description mandates should be actively shifted away from the First
Amendment rights of the physician and towards developing a
doctrine that bolsters a patient’s right not to hear. Further, this will
have implications for the regulation of medicine and for public
health. Ultimately, shifting the analysis from physician rights to
patient rights is not only critical to women’s rights in the context of
abortion care, but also essential for upholding the common-law
doctrine of informed consent and for strengthening the continued
role of law in protecting public health.
A. Informed Consent and the Interplay Between
Physicians’ and Patients’ Rights
One primary reason to shift the abortion rights discourse
from a physician’s right against government-compelled speech to a
patient’s right against compelled listening is grounded in the critical
144

In fact, the setting in which a woman finds herself during an ultrasound
description – in the confines of a physician’s office, with the “speaker” – and
not in the privacy of one’s home (as is the case in Went For It) would arguably
make the messages at-issue far more intrusive than a direct mailing.
145
See, e.g., McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014).
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importance of informed consent. Founded predominantly on
notions of patient autonomy,146 informed consent typically requires
that doctors disclose all “material risks” to a patient, applying either
a reasonable physician standard or a reasonable person standard as
the mechanism by which courts determine what doctors should
consider “material.”147 While the doctor – guided, in part, by fears
of tort liability – typically determines what specific information to
share with a patient, under the doctrine, “the decision [to refuse
medical interventions] belongs to the patient.148 Ideally, once armed
with enough information, the patient can make an autonomous
decision about his or her health care.
This view of informed consent, however, is rosy. While
many scholars argue that ultrasound description mandates and other
abortion-related informed consent requirements can, and should, be
struck down as “fundamentally inconsistent with the doctrine of
informed consent,”149 other scholars, such as Nadia Sawicki, note
that these laws “should [perhaps] be viewed not as anomalies, but
rather as explicit manifestations of the sort of value judgments that
have long been implicit in the law and doctrine of informed
consent.”150
For example, despite the notion that the informed consent
doctrine was “driven in large part by a desire to combat the

146

Vanderwalker, supra note 5, at 5.
Id. (citing Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
148
Vanderwalker, supra note 5, at 5.
149
Nadia N. Sawicki, The Abortion Informed Consent Debate: More Light,
Less Heat, 21 CORNELL J. L. & POL’Y 1, 3 (2011) (“Scholars of law, medicine,
and ethics argue that the new disclosure requirements are fundamentally
inconsistent with the doctrine of informed consent, which obligates
physicians to provide patients with sufficient information to make
autonomous and educated decisions about their medical care.”). See also
Sanger, supra note 16, at 403 (describing how seeing a fetal image on an
ultrasound may “distort judgment” rather than inform it); Maya Manian, The
Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and Abortion Decision-Making, 16
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 223, 226 (“Abortion law invokes and then
misuses ‘informed consent’ terminology.”).
150
Sawicki, supra note 149, at 5.
147
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paternalism of medicine,”151 the doctrine is still often critiqued as
“too physician-centric.” 152 A patient’s autonomy interests are,
arguably, more recognized as central to the informed consent
doctrine today,153 but both state- and doctor-proscribed paternalism
have long impacted and still impact what information is and is not
shared with patients.154 By focusing solely on the physician’s rights
against compelled speech, the public health rhetoric around
ultrasound description mandates, while well meaning, may
exacerbate this physician-centric view of informed consent.155 By
refocusing on patients’ rights against compelled listening in the
abortion context, this concern can, in part, be addressed and ensure

151

Sonia M. Suter, The Politics of Information: Informed Consent in Abortion
and End-of-Life Decision Making, 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 15 (2013).
152
Haupt, supra note 59, at 1288 (“There is continued debate over whether
the current tort paradigm [around informed consent] appropriately accounts
for patients’ interests, or whether it continues to be too physician-centric.”).
153
See id. at 1287–88.
154
See, e.g., id. at 1288 (“There is a troubling history of paternalism in the
medical profession that limited the amount of information shared with
patients.”); see also, Suter, supra note 150, at 12(“Historically, physicians
disclosed medical information only to persuade patients to do what physicians
thought was best for them or to try to offer hope and comfort. Indeed,
deception in certain cases was not only acceptable, but sometimes considered
necessary, to achieve those goals.”); Sawicki, supra note 149, at 19 (“[B]oth
the ethical standard of informed consent, which looks to materiality of the
information to the patient’s decision, and the legal standard, which looks to
the standard of a reasonable patient or physician, necessarily are dependent
on social norms and values.”).
155
Recognizing a professional’s speech rights may, in fact, put patients and
professionals at odds, because physicians alone will then determine what is
relevant to a patient’s decision-making. See, e.g., Haupt, supra note 59, at
1300 (“Under the knowledge community focused theory of professional
speech, the professional is to decide what is relevant professional information.
The knowledge community’s insights not only determine what accurate
information is, but also what is relevant in any given situation according to
the specific circumstances of the client.”). While this cannot always be
avoided, given the asymmetry of knowledge in a doctor-patient relationship,
it is worth striving for doctor-patient dialogue that is predominantly driven by
the patient’s ability to ask for information and to refuse doctor-provided
information.

SHULMAN-LANIEL: A PATIENT’S RIGHT NOT TO HEAR: THE PUBLIC HEALTH CASE FOR CHALLENGING
PRE-ABORTION ULTRASOUND DESCRIPTION MANDATES BY REFOCUSING ON THE LISTENER

56

DEPAUL J. WOMEN, GEN & LAW

[Vol. VII: II

that a patient-focused doctrine of informed consent is more able to
emerge.
Moreover, despite many advocates’ concerns that abortionrelated informed consent requirements are too politicized or
intervene too greatly in the doctor-patient relationship,156 informed
consent laws will never be value-neutral157 and striving for a noninterventionist, value-neutral informed consent doctrine should not
be the goal. In fact, by focusing the discussion of ultrasound
description mandates on establishing a physician’s right not to be
compelled to be the state’s mouthpiece, the public health legal
community may set a dangerous precedent that greatly restricts the
government’s ability to compel physician speech, speech that is
often essential for promoting patient autonomy in medical decisionmaking and in protecting informed consent. 158 “Ordinarily, the
doctrines of free speech and informed consent coexist without much
difficulty.”159 Yet, by putting a physician’s common law duty to
156

See, e.g., Zick, supra note 15, at 1357 (describing how “[t]he politicization
of professional speech undermines not just individual client trust and
confidence, but to some extent the very notion of professionalism itself.”).
157
See Sawicki, supra note 149, at 19 (“[E]ven the normative view of
informed consent as an ethical ideal recognizes that neutrality, objectivity,
and impartiality are often impossible, and sometimes unwarranted.”).
158
Moreover, the state sometimes does have a substantial interest in barring
professional speech. In Doe, for example, the court found the evidence that
SOCE counseling is “ineffective or harmful” compelling towards its
reasoning that the state had a substantial interest in protecting potential
patients. Doe, 783 F.3d 150 at 153(citing King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d
216, 235 (3d Cir. 2014)). If, then, the state itself has a right to bar speech to
protect patients, why shouldn’t the patient also have the same right to bar
speech? Even though ultrasound description mandates are most often
discussed in the context of “compelled” professional speech, ultrasound
description mandates, too, can be considered as a question of when and by
whom a professional’s speech can be prohibited. A First Amendment right
against compelled listening is, in a sense, a right for patients to themselves
restrict the speech of professionals; speech that may be, at best, “ineffective”
and, at worst, “harmful” to patients.
159
See, e.g., David Orentlicher, Abortion and Compelled Physician Speech 2
(Ind. Univ. Robert H. McKinney Sch. of Law Research Paper No. 2014-31,
2014).
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obtain informed consent from patients and a physician’s First
Amendment rights in tension, we create a conflict for public health
that may undermine decades of legal precedent to protect patients
who, almost invariably, have less information about a procedure
than their physicians.160
B. The Negative Implications of Focusing on Physicians’
First Amendment Rights
The “regulation of medicine has long been recognized as
within the state’s police powers” and medical practices are a
common venue through which populations interact with a state’s
public health systems. 161 From preventing gun injuries in
households with children to advancing vaccination campaigns,
regulating physician speech and promoting strong informed consent
policies must continue to be an important tool for regulating the
practice of medicine and for advancing public health. The public
health community wants, at times, to require doctors to advance the
state’s interests in order to protect patients.162 We want, at times, for
the government to dictate that a physician should offer to a patient
information that may be material to her decision-making.163 Setting
160

See id. at 1.
Suter, supra note 5, at 22 (citing Post, supra note 5, at 950).
162
For example, in the case of promoting widespread vaccination, the public
health community often argues that medical professionals should be required
to provide detailed information about the risks of not vaccinating one’s
children to parents hesitant about or refusing the recommended vaccination
schedule. See, e.g., Kristin S. Hendrix, et al., Ethics and Childhood
Vaccination Policy in the United States, 106 AMER. J. PUB. HEALTH 273, 276
(describing how “the documented difficulty of communicating with vaccinehesitant and vaccine-opposing families” may warrant “making the informedconsent process more educationally intensive and applicable not only to
parents choosing to immunize their children but also, and especially, to those
refusing or declining immunizations or requesting a modified schedule.”).
163
See, e.g., Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902 (1980) (holding that a
physician breached his duty of care when the doctor failed to inform a patient
of the potentially fatal consequences of declining a pap smear.). We also want
the patient to ultimately be able to dictate when the physician’s speech should
stop or when the speech is no longer material to her decision-making. See
infra notes 171, 177 and accompanying text.
161
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a precedent that compelling physician speech is not within the scope
of these police powers may, therefore, have dangerous implications
for how the state can advance its interest in public health through its
regulation of the medical profession in the future.
By refocusing on the patient’s right against compelled
listening, it becomes clear that the state’s use of informed consent
and the patient’s own rights need not be at odds. In fact, the state’s
use of informed consent can strengthen the unique interplay of
physician-patient relationship. As First Amendment scholar Paula
Berg notes in an article about informed consent, “government
regulation of doctor-patient speech may in some cases be necessary
to increase the flow of information to patients, thereby facilitating
the attainment of consent and thus advancing the First Amendment
goals of self-fulfillment and autonomy.”164 As described in Part I of
this article, by their very nature, informed consent laws can help to
correct the power imbalance inherent between a physician (and their
“knowledge community”) and a patient. 165 “States are rightly
concerned about the asymmetries of power and information that
inhere in professional client relationships.”166 When the patient is
central to the informed consent doctrine, informed consent laws can
help to fundamentally correct for these concerns.
Ultimately, if we begin to ground the discussion around
abortion-specific informed consent laws in a patient’s right not to
hear, the First Amendment can advance in conformity with the goals
of informed consent and can, in fact, strengthen the informed
consent doctrine. Even with the recognition that informed consent
laws are inherently paternalistic, when looked at from the
perspective of the patient’s right not to listen, abortion-specific
informed consent requirements, in general – and ultrasound
description mandates, in particular – run afoul of informed
consent’s doctrinal goals.167 As many scholars have noted, “[t]he
164

Berg, supra note 57, at 206.
Zick, supra note 15, at 1352.
166
Id.
167
See, e.g., Orentlicher, supra note 159, at 2. See also Sanger, supra note 16,
at 378 (“Although couched in the protective terms of informed consent, these
statutes are unabashedly meant to transform the embryo or fetus from an
abstraction to a baby in the eyes of the potentially aborting mother.”); Rachel
165
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Supreme Court has allowed a degree of paternalism to permeate
informed consent doctrine for abortions even though this is absent
in traditional informed consent and prohibited in other speech
cases.”168 By compelling listening, ultrasound description mandates
“[interfere] with the decision-making process by not allowing adults
to choose what information to consider in developing their thoughts
and making up their minds.”169 The mandates also “[force] . . .
information onto unwilling listeners . . . [potentially] unduly
[influencing] the ultimate decision made.”170
By refocusing on the patient’s rights as listener, the rhetoric
regarding ultrasound description mandates can also acknowledge
the essential importance of the physician-patient relationship, 171
and the value that patients can bring to this relationship, while still
maintaining informed consent. In recognizing a patient’s right not
Benson Gold & Elizabeth Nash, State Abortion Counseling Policies and the
Fundamental Principles of Informed Consent, 10 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV.
6, (2007) (“[T]he use of the informed consent process in this way clearly runs
counter to fundamental ethical principles that have long guided the practice
of medicine.”).
168
Camburn, supra note 49, at 311–312 (citing Dale Carpenter, The
Antipaternalism Principle in the First Amendment, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV.
579, 633 (2004) (emphasis added)). See also Suter, supra note 5, at 27 (noting
that “[i]n fact, informed consent doctrine emerged to ensure that patients
could overcome the paternalism of medicine when physicians alone decided
on behalf of the patient what the patient needed to know.”).
169
Corbin, supra note 7, at 982.
170
Id; see also Howard Minkoff & Mary Faith Marshall, GovernmentScripted Consent: When Medical Ethics and Law Collide, HASTINGS CTR.
REP. 21, 21 (2009) (“The twin tenets of voluntariness [on the patient’s part]
and adequate disclosure [by the physician] are not independent silos, but
rather mutually dependent fundamentals for the exercise of individual choice.
The selection of data to be shared, the values that frame the facts, and the
emotional perspective by which they are proffered all contribute to a context
that either animates or degrades a person’s autonomy.”).
171
Zita Lazzarini, South Dakota’s Abortion Script — Threatening the
Physician–Patient Relationship, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2189, 2191 (2008)
(discussing South Dakota’s informed consent abortion script, writing that the
state’s “script also threatens the physician patient relationship in ways that
may resonate far beyond the issue of abortion. Patients have a right to expect
that physicians will provide them with accurate and complete medical
information that will guide them in making medical decisions.”).
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to hear, patients – guided, in part, by their doctors – can assess what
information is “material” to their decision-making, without being
subjected to speech that they deem harmful or immaterial.172 If the
discourse is shifted to patients, a woman who decides that the
description of an ultrasound is irrelevant to her abortion decision
can autonomously choose not to hear and not be required by the

172

Following Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902 (1980), there is a great deal
of case law discussing the implications for informed consent doctrine of a
patient refusing treatment. However, I am aware of no case on-point in which
a court found that informed consent explicitly requires that a physician tell a
patient something that the physician believes is material to the patient’s
decision-making even after the patient makes clear their explicit desire not to
hear. Further, in the absence of law requiring specific informed consent
disclosures, the American Medical Association and the American Congress
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists both guide physicians with the notion that
patients should be allowed to refuse material information and to determine
the “quantity and specificity” of the information communicated by a
physician. Amer. Med. Ass’n, Opinion 8.08 – Informed Consent, available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/codemedical-ethics/opinion808.page? (last visited Feb. 25, 2016); see also Amer.
Cong. on Obstetrics & Gynecology, ACOG Committee Opinion on Informed
Consent (reaffirmed 2015), available at http://www.acog.org/ResourcesAnd-Publications/Committee-Opinions/Committee-on-Ethics/InformedConsent (last visited Feb. 25, 2016).
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state to do so.173 Patients themselves can guide the disclosure174 and
be treated by the law as “capable of making their own decisions”
regarding whether to undergo this medical procedure.175 While the
physician may need to carefully navigate the initial discussion with
a patient to determine what information she considers
relevant/irrelevant, women should ultimately determine for
themselves what they want to hear. 176 In contrast, if the state
continues to compel listening, the state, in effect, “removes
decision-making authority from the individual” and, with it, the
patient’s autonomy.177 As Carol Sanger writes, “Women understand
that abortion terminates pregnancy and that some form of life . . . is
extinguished by virtue of the procedure; that is its very point. But .
173

Many women may, in fact, voluntarily choose to view an ultrasound prior
to making an abortion decision. See Orentlicher, supra note 159, at 16 (“More
studies are needed to inform the question, but the data to date suggest that it
makes sense for physicians to offer women the opportunity to view their
ultrasounds when they are having ultrasounds performed. A substantial
minority, if not a majority, of women want to view the ultrasound, the viewing
is generally a positive experience, and for a small number of women who are
uncertain whether to have an abortion, the ultrasound may influence their
thinking.”). The same woman may still be given pamphlets or be asked to
sign informed consent documents that advance the government’s message in
ways that she does not want to read, but as she is less captive in this scenario
and not subject to professional speech within the trusting bonds of a
physician-patient relationship, these types of government messages may
continue to be constitutionally valid even if a right against compelled listening
is further established.
174
See, e.g., Suter, supra note 5, at 27. These laws currently “demand[] the
communication of irrelevant information toward an arguably nonscientific
ideological end (dissuading women from obtaining an otherwise legal
professional service).” Haupt, supra note 59, at 1299.
175
Manian, supra note 149, at 224.
176
Sawicki, supra note 149, at 34–35 (“The challenge is finding a way to
explain to a patient what information is available to her without running afoul
of her right to refuse information, but this challenge is resolvable. One way
of resolving this would be to begin the informed consent discussion by asking
the patient what information she considers relevant and what information she
would prefer not to hear— although this approach, applied in the abortion
context exclusively, again runs the risk of buying into assumptions about
women’s emotional vulnerability.”).
177
Strauss, supra note 110, at 108–09.
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. . mandatory ultrasound[s] improperly burden[] the ability of
women to make decisions about abortion . . . . It is harassment
masquerading as knowledge.”178
By shifting to a patient-focused approach, we can better
promote the continued empowerment of patients in their health care
decision-making, while still holding open the door for public health
law to advance population health by ensuring that patients have
available to them information that may be material to their needs.
Vesting the First Amendment analysis in the patient’s right against
compelled listening would do precisely this. The state has a
profound role in continuing to regulate and shape informed consent,
“but only to the extent that it promotes, as opposed to hinders,
informed decision making.” 179 By grounding abortion informed
consent analysis in the patient’s right not to hear, the public health
law community can better reach the “aspirational goal for informed
consent” of “[basing] disclosure on both the physician’s expertise
and knowledge of the patient’s condition and the patient’s
preference for information and how it is dispensed, all of which is
clarified in an individualized dialogue between the two.” 180
Establishing that the patient has control over what she hears and
what she refuses to hear allows for strong protections concerning
the principles and procedures of informed consent, while also
serving the goals of promoting autonomy in medical decisionmaking, of preserving the integrity of the physician-patient
relationship (a relationship that is strained when the government
compels the physician to speak and the patient cannot refuse to

178

Sanger, supra note 16, at 360 (describing the supposed “health” of the fetus
that a woman has chosen to abort obscures the relevant medical questions
relating to the procedure itself and its outcomes). If informed consent is to be
driven by information that may be medically relevant, ultrasound description
mandates are by their very nature, not medically relevant.
179
Suter, supra note 5, at 31.
180
Id. at 27.
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listen),181 and of allowing the state to further protect and advance
public health.182
C. Limitations
As described throughout, the courts have yet to build a firm
doctrine that establishes a patient’s right not to hear that would both
bolster patient autonomy and strengthen public health. While the
rhetoric of the Eleventh Circuit in Wollschlaeger provides for some
recognition of this right, it does so dangerously; instead of
recognizing a right for the patient to refuse to listen, it prohibits the
patient from ever having the opportunity to reject or request
professional speech. Wollschlaeger’s understanding of a patient’s
rights, therefore, continues to undermine the ability of the state to
regulate public health, while also undermining patient’s autonomy
and access to potentially essential information.
Moreover, applying the captive audience doctrine to
abortion informed consent laws raises additional questions of how
states can continue to regulate the physician-patient relationship if
all patients are “captive” as soon as they don a hospital gown or
close the doctor’s office door. However, “[t]he right against
compelled listening does not preclude the government from
advocating policy positions or launching public education
campaigns . . . only when there is captivity.”183 The government has
a myriad of ways to share its message, 184 including through a
physician, so long as the speech can readily be avoided or refused
by the listener. Yet, by forcing physicians to hold the listener
captive (in the ultrasound description context), the state goes above
181

The court in Stuart recognizes this by its comment: “She must endure the
embarrassing spectacle of averting her eyes and covering her ears while her
physician—a person to whom she should be encouraged to listen—recites
information to her.” Stuart, 774 F.3d at 253.
182
As Sawicki notes, even in the context of abortion, the state’s purported
interest in the health of the fetus and of the mother can still be advanced in
the context of informed consent, if not within the context of the doctor-patient
relationship. See infra note 184 and accompanying text.
183
Corbin, supra note 7, at 980.
184
Id.
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and beyond the paternalism arguably inherent in public health law,
violating the underpinnings of informed consent.185
Similarly, as critical as it may be for patients to have the
ultimate say in what is or is not material to their healthcare decisionmaking, there may, in fact, be instances in which a patient should
not be given the opportunity to reject critical medical information.
For example, if one is about to undergo an elective medical
procedure that carries a high risk of death, would it suffice for the
state to merely offer this information through pamphlets and forms,
or should the state instead require that all patients be told by their
physicians of this risk, with no opt-out provision for the speech? It
is possible that there is a threshold beyond which the right against
compelled listening should not exist. In establishing this threshold,
anti-abortion activists may argue that the information provided in
ultrasound mandates serves such a substantial state interest in the
life of the fetus that the information provided to a patient should be
mandatorily received. Ultimately, a doctrinal test of the listener’s
rights would help to distinguish between instances where patients
have full autonomy in their listening and instances where the
information provided is so critical as to trump the patients’ right
against compelled listening. As the doctrine and scholarly rhetoric
on this issue develop, this will remain an essential question.
Moreover, while many of the arguments supporting a right
against compelling listening come from a concern about “the state’s

185

As Nadia Sawicki writes, “some of the information currently required by
abortion disclosure statutes need not be conveyed by the physician directly
but may instead be communicated (as often occurs) in the form of a state
pamphlet. To the extent that abortion disclosure laws require conveyance of
non-medical information, such laws would be more consistent with informed
consent doctrine if the state, rather than the physician, were to make the
disclosures . . . it must be emphasized that introducing the state’s
communicative message at this particular time and place can only be defended
as a matter of convenience—and not because state speech is relevant to,
analogous to, or part of the informed consent dialogue between physician and
patient.”). Sawicki, supra note 149, at 32.
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reliance on emotion to persuade,”186 the use of compelled emotion
is often an important and effective tool that may continue to need a
place in public health law and communications. From Smokey the
Bear to anti-tobacco campaigns, the government often uses imagery
to speak;187 in many contexts, shocking images may be the most
effective method to promote public health. 188 Reconciling the
contexts in which emotional imagery may create more harm than
good may be a critical part of future analysis.189 A woman, in the
captive setting of the exam room, should not be required to listen to
the emotionally unsettling messages that ultrasound descriptions
require,190 just as a smoker encountering the emotionally startling
warnings on a cigarette pack is not required to read them. While
there may seem to be an inherent tension between the effectiveness
of emotional public health messaging and the rights of the listener,
by establishing a right to refuse to hear these emotional messages,
this tension may also be reconciled, while still allowing the public
health community to attempt to expose listeners to – but not force
186

Nadia Sawicki, Compelling Images: The Constitutionality of Emotionally
Persuasive Health Campaigns, 73 MD. L. REV. 458, 458 (2014) [hereinafter
Compelling Images].
187
Id. at 459.
188
See, e.g., id. at 460 (citing Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and
Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628, 36,674 (June 22, 2011)) (“Notably, the
FDA selected these images precisely because of their emotional impact, citing
evidence that ‘messages that arouse emotional reactions’ or ‘generate an
immediate emotional response’ are more likely to trigger behavioral
changes.”).
189
See generally, Compelling Images, supra note 186, at 460.
190
Under the current First Amendment doctrine allowing for “truthful,” “nonmisleading” messages, even “’truthful’ information” such as that at-issue
during an ultrasound “may nevertheless be misleading when it takes
advantage of individuals’ likelihood to be inappropriately persuaded by
emotional biases. That is, empirical research demonstrates that individuals
tend to be more easily persuaded when in a fearful or anxious emotional statethe emotional state most likely to be elicited by the information provided.”
Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion: Implications of
Social Science Research on Emotion for Reading Casey, 83 WASH. L. REV.
1, 36 (2008). But see Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v.
Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 577–78 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that the required
disclosures associated with an ultrasound description law represented “the
epitome of truthful, non-misleading information”).
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upon captive listeners – emotional messages that seek to advance
population health.
V.

CONCLUSION

As discussed, ultrasound description mandates are at odds
with the purported goal of promoting patient autonomy. However,
continued attempts to dismantle these regulations by focusing on a
physician’s First Amendment right against compelled speech may
have dangerous implications for the regulation of medicine and for
public health more broadly. Instead, by establishing a patient’s First
Amendment right not to hear, the public health legal community can
strike a balance that continues to allow for broad promotion and
regulation of the physician-patient relationship, while also
respecting and enhancing patient autonomy. By continuing to allow
physicians to speak and to communicate the government’s interests
in protecting health, but also by insisting that patients be allowed to
refuse to listen and to determine what information may be material
to their decision-making, we can lift the “informed consent” veil
that protects pre-abortion ultrasound description mandates. In its
place, by establishing a patient’s right not to hear, we can enhance
patients’ rights by re-building a patient-centric view of informed
consent, giving patients the ability to avoid unwanted speech, and
allowing for the continuing strength of the state’s role in promoting
public health.

